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Human choices are remarkably susceptible to the context in which options are presented.
The introduction of an inferior option (a decoy) into the choice set can make one of
the original options (the target) more attractive than and the other original option (the
competitor). This so called “decoy effect” represents a striking violation of the “context-
invariant” axiom, yet its underlying neural mechanisms are not well understood. Here, we
used a novel gambling task in conjunction with functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) to elucidate its neural basis. At both the stimulus and decision phases, choice sets
with decoys activated the occipital gyrus and deactivated the inferior parietal gyrus. At
the decision phase, choosing the targets vs. the competitors elicited stronger anterior
insula activation, suggesting that perceptual salience drives heuristic decision making in
the decoy effect. Moreover, across participants, activity in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
predicted a reduced susceptibility to the decoy effect, indicating that resisting the tendency
to make heuristic decisions is taxing. Our findings highlight the power of the decoy effect
in laboratory settings and document the neural mechanisms underlying the decoy effect.
Keywords: fMRI, decoy effect, decision making, salience processing, cognitive conflict
INTRODUCTION
A central tenet of rational decision-making is logical consis-
tent preference, independent of irrelevant options. However, the
proposition that human decisions are “context-invariant” is chal-
lenged by a wealth of empirical data. One typical phenomenon
of context-dependent preference is the decoy effect (Huber et al.,
1982). As shown in Figure 1A, A is better on a given attribute (e.g.,
reward magnitude) but worse on another attribute (e.g., reward
probability) than B. Thus, A and B are competitive to each other.
A third option, such as CA (termed the decoy) is added, which
is similar yet inferior to A, but dissimilar to B. According to the
“context-invariant” hypothesis, the inferior decoy C would not
influence people’s choices between A and B. However, in reality,
the decoy shifts choices toward A which is similar to the decoy
and also better than the decoy. In this situation, A becomes the
“target” and B the “competitor”. This phenomenon is called the
decoy effect or asymmetric dominance effect.
The decoy effect has been replicated in a wide variety of
choice situations involving not only commercial products (Josiam
and Hobson, 1995), but also jobs (Slaughter et al., 2011) and
political candidates (Pan et al., 1995). However, the neural mech-
anisms underlying this effect remain unclear. Hedgcock and Rao
(2009) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to
study the neural basis of the decoy effect. Greater activation in
the amygdala is associated with choice sets with no decoy, as
compared with choice sets enriched with decoys. They proposed
trade-off aversion as an explanation of the decoy effect. Another
preliminary study using magnetoencephalography (MEG) with
the same paradigm revealed that right frontal areas of the brain
showed neural activity differences within 750 ms when partici-
pants considered choice sets with a decoy vs. choices sets without
a decoy (Hedgcock et al., 2010). The same areas of the brain had
activity differences within 1000 ms when choices of the target
or non-target were compared. However, the exact brain regions
underlying the decoy effect are still unknown from this study due
to the relatively poor spatial resolution of MEG.
Decision field theory (Roe et al., 2001) provides a detailed
explanation for why target options are preferentially chosen in the
decoy effect. According to decision field theory, comparing the
dominated decoy (e.g., CA) with the other two original options
(A and B) produces a negative preference state for the dominated
decoy, which feeds through a negative inhibitory link to the
closely positioned dominant option. Thus, the decoy makes the
dominant option appear more attractive. The competitor does
not experience any bolstering effect because it is too dissimilar
to the dominated decoy. The pair of the target and the decoy
is much more salient than the pair of the competitor and the
decoy because of the similarity and difference between the target
and the decoy. That is, the decoy effect occurs when the salient
similarity between the target and the decoy can be detected.
Similarly, Bordalo et al. (2012) proposed a salience theory to
explain the decoy effect. The salience of the attribute deter-
mines the attention the decision maker pays to these attributes
as well as their weight in his decision (Bordalo et al., 2012).
Using eye-tracking technology and the paradigm used in the
study of Hedgcock and Rao (2009) and Chen (2013) found
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental design. (A) A graphical illustration of the
decoy effect paradigm. (B) Experimental task design. At the beginning
of each trial, an asterisk appeared on the screen for 2 s to engage
attention and eye fixation. Then participants were shown either two
(two-option condition) or three gamble options (three-option condition).
The gamble option was shown as a pie chart depicting the probability of
winning a certain amount of money. The amounts in the gamble options
varied from U2 to U92, and the probabilities varied from 1% to 86%. In
the two-option condition, the expected values (EVs) of these two
gamble options were equivalent. In the three-option condition, the decoy
gamble options were added. The decoy gamble option had either the
same amount of money or the same probability but with a smaller
probability or amount of money than one of the two original gamble
options, making this original gamble option the target, and the other
original gamble option the competitor. The only difference between the
three-option and the two-option conditions was whether the decoy
option was presented or not. The two gamble options in the two-option
condition were randomly presented in two of three positions. The
gamble options were presented for 5 s, during which participants were
instructed to make a choice by pressing 1, 2 or 3 on the keypad.
Participants were also told that during the task they would not receive
feedback concerning the outcomes of their decisions.
that participants raised the rate of gazing at the decoy boosted
attribute when in the choice sets with decoys compared with in
the choice sets with no decoy, supporting the saliency account.
Thus, salience processing might play a key role in the decoy effect.
Several brain regions have been implicated in salience processing,
including the anterior insula and amygdala. The anterior insula
is sensitive to salient stimuli (Dehaene et al., 2001; Kuo et al.,
2009) and has been considered as an important brain region in
a “salience network” (Menon and Uddin, 2010). The amygdala
also plays an important role in saliency processing (Santos et al.,
2011).
The similarity between the target and the decoy also makes
people easy to identify the dominating relationship between the
two. This is the dominance heuristic account of the decoy effect
(Simonson, 1989; Wedell, 1991). When participants run counter
to the decoy effect, they are more likely to rely on the ana-
lytic processing instead of the heuristic processing. The heuristic
process is automatic and effortless. Extra cognitive control is
required to inhibit this automatic process. This may also produce
a conflict between heuristic and analytic processing (De Neys,
2012; Loureiro, 2013). The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has
been implicated in both cognitive control and conflict detection
(Botvinick et al., 2004; De Martino et al., 2006; Carter and van
Veen, 2007; Guo et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2013). For example,
when participants ran counter to the framing effect, there was
enhanced activity in the ACC (De Martino et al., 2006; Xu et al.,
2013).
In the present study, we investigate neural mechanism of the
decoy effect using fMRI combined with a novel gambling task
(see Section Materials and Methods). We predicted that regions
implicated in salience detection, heuristic decision making,




Sixteen healthy, right-handed volunteers (mean age and SD
24.80 ± 1.32, nine females) participated in fMRI scanning. All
participants had a university degree or were in the process of
obtaining one. The study was conducted with the approval of the
Academic Committee of the School of South China Normal Uni-
versity. All participants gave written, informed consent and were
informed of their right to discontinue participation at any time.
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EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM
Before the experiment, the participants were familiarized with the
decision-making task, and given practice trials. At the beginning
of each trial, an asterisk was presented on the screen for 2 s to
engage attention and eye fixation. Then participants were shown
either two (two-option condition) or three gamble options (three-
option condition). The gamble option was shown as a pie chart
depicting the probability of winning a certain amount of money.
The amounts of the gamble options varied from U2 to U91
and the probabilities varied from 1% to 86%. In the two-option
condition, the expected values (EVs) of these two gamble options
were equivalent. In the three-option condition, the decoy gamble
options were added. The decoy gamble option had either the same
amount of money or the same probability but with a smaller
probability or amount of money than one of the two original
gamble options, making this original gamble option the target,
and the other original gamble option the competitor. The only
difference between the three-option and the two-option condi-
tions was whether the decoy option was presented or not. The
two gamble options in the two-option condition were randomly
presented in two of three positions. We also included “catch”
trials to ensure that participants remained actively engaged in the
decision-making task throughout the course of the experiments.
In both the two-option and three-option catch trials, the expected
utility of one gamble option was markedly higher than other
gamble option(s). The gamble options were presented for 5 s,
during which participants were instructed to make a choice by
pressing 1, 2 or 3 on the keypad. Participants were also told that
during the task they would not receive feedback concerning the
outcomes of their decisions (see Figure 1B).
The scanning phase of the experiment lasted 24 min, which
was composed of 200 trials (88 two options condition, 88 three
options condition and 24 catch trials) ordered randomly. By
allowing randomization across conditions, the influence of the
brain responses in the previous trial on a particular type of trial
was balanced. It can also minimize anticipation and habituation
effects.
Participants were told that their performance in the task
determined how much they would be awarded at the end of the
experiment. One trial was randomly chosen and implemented.
All participants received a base payment of 100 yuan (about 15
US dollars) plus any extra reward in the experiment.
fMRI DATA ACQUISITION AND PREPROCESSING
MRI scanning was conducted on a 3.0-T Siemens Allegra scanner.
Whole-brain data were acquired with echo planar T2*-weighted
imaging, sensitive to blood oxygenation level-dependent signal
contrast (32 oblique axial slice, 3 mm thickness, 3 mm in-plane
resolution; repetition time, 2000 ms, echo time, 30 ms). The
imaging data were acquired at a 30◦ angle from the anterior
commissure–posterior commissure (AC-PC) line to maximize
orbital sensitivity (Deichmann et al., 2003). T1-weighted struc-
tural images were acquired at a resolution of 1× 1× 1 mm.
Functional image preprocessing was carried out using SPM8.1
To allow for equilibration effects, the first five volumes were
1www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
discarded. The EPI images were sync interpolated in time for cor-
rection of slice-timing differences and realigned to the first scan
by rigid-body transformations to correct for head movements.
Utilizing linear and nonlinear transformations and smoothing
with a Gaussian kernel of full-width-half-maximum 8 mm, EPI
and structural images were co-registered and normalized to the
T1 standard template in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
space (MNI—International Consortium for Brain Mapping).
Global changes were removed by high-pass temporal filtering with
a cutoff of 128 s to remove low-frequency drifts in signal.
fMRI DATA ANALYSIS
Statistical analyses were performed using the general linear model
(GLM). Three main types of events were distinguished: decisions
in the two-option condition (two-option), targets in the three-
option condition (targets), and competitors in the three-option
condition (competitors). For each individual participant, two
models were conducted for these events with the onsets of gamble
options presentation (at the stimulus phase) and the onsets of
making decisions (at the decision phase), respectively. Events
were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function
(HRF). Six head-motion parameters defined by the realignment
were added to the model as regressors of no interest. Multiple
linear regression was then run to generate parameter estimates for
each regressor at every voxel.
In the first-level analysis, we conducted two contrasts: three-
option (targets + competitors) vs. two-option and the reverse
contrast at the stimulus phase; at the decision phase, we compared
decisions in the following experimental conditions: two-option
vs. targets, targets vs. two-option, two-option vs. competitors,
competitors vs. two-option, targets chosen vs. competitors cho-
sen, and competitors chosen vs. targets chosen. The contrast
(difference in β) images of the first-level analysis were entered into
one-sample t-test for the second-level group analysis conducted
with a random effects statistical model (Penny and Holmes, 2004).
The images of targets vs. competitors contrast at the decision
phase were correlated with the decoy effect in behavior in a simple
regression across participants.
Small volume correction (SVC) was used on a priori regions of
interest including the following: the anterior insula, amygdala and
the ACC, defined by the corresponding automated anatomical
labeling mask (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). Activations in other




The percentage of choosing the gamble options which had
markedly higher expected outcomes was 88.5% ± 10.6% (mean
± SD) in “catch” trials. Participants were highly accurate in
making correct choices in these “catch” trials, providing evi-
dence of continued engagement with the task throughout the
experiment.
In the two-option condition, there was no difference between
the percentages of choosing the left or right pie-chart in the two-
option condition (47.5% vs. 48.9%, t15 = −0.748, p = 0.466).
When decoys were added, participants revealed a preference for
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FIGURE 2 | Behavioral results. (A) Percentage of trials in which participants chose the target, competitor and decoy. (B) Reaction time of choosing the target,
competitor and decoy. (C) Individual differences in susceptibility to the decoy effect, i.e., the percentage difference between choosing the target as compared
to 50%.
target options over the competitor options (57.3% > 40.8%,
t15 = 4.316, p < 0.001, Figure 2A). Decoys were rarely chosen
(about 1%). The behavioral results indicated that participants’
decision making processes were significantly affected by decoys.
Reaction times for decision were also affected by decoys (two-
option condition, 2212 ms; three-option condition, 2363 ms,
t15 = −5.743, p < 0.001, Figure 2B). The decoy effect, defined as
the frequency of choosing the target in the three-option condition
minus the 50% chance level, was calculated for each partici-
pant. It varied across participants, ranging from −0.07 to 0.22
(Figure 2C).
In target-chosen and competitor-chosen trials, there was no
significant difference in EVs between chosen targets and chosen
competitors (10.54 vs. 11.08, t15 = 2.249, p = 0.154), indicating
that preference for the decoy boosted targets cannot be simply
explained by the differences in EVs between two experimental
conditions.
BRAIN ACTIVATION AT THE STIMULUS PHASE
At the stimulus phase, greater activity in bilateral middle occipital
gyri was found in three-option condition (targets + competitors)
than in two-option condition (Figure 3A; Table 1). In the reverse
contrast, we observed greater activation in the inferior parietal
lobule (Figure 3B; Table 1). No significant brain activation was
found between targets and competitors.
BRAIN ACTIVATION AT THE DECISION PHASE
At the decision phase, we compared decisions in two-option
trials with targets chosen condition and competitors chosen
condition in the three-option trials, respectively (see Table 2).
Compared with targets, two-option showed greater activation in
the precuneus (Figure 4A); compared with competitors, two-
option showed greater activation in the inferior parietal gyrus
(Figure 4B). Conjunction analysis confirmed that two-option
activated the bilateral inferior parietal gyri, compared with targets
and competitors (Figure 4C).
Both targets and competitors activated the middle occipital
gyrus, compared with two-option (Figures 4D,E). Conjunction
analysis confirmed that, targets and competitors activated the
bilateral middle occipital gyri when compared with two-option
(Figure 4F).
Further, we compared the brain responses in the contrasts of
targets vs. competitors and the reverse contrast. Compared with
choosing the competitors, choosing the targets engaged greater
activity in the left anterior insula (x = −39, y = 6, z = 3, Z-
score = 3.20; x = −36, y = 3, z = 12, Z-score = 3.13, PFWE < 0.05
SVC) (Figure 4G). No significant brain activation was found in
the reverse contrast.
In light of the substantial inter-subject variability in behavioral
susceptibility to the decoy effect, we next identified subject-
specific differences in neural activity associated with their decision
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FIGURE 3 | Brain activation at the stimulus phase. Regions with significant activation for three-option minus two-option (A) and for two-option minus
three-option (B).
Table 1 | Brain activation at the stimulus phase.
Brain Regions Z -scores MNI Coordinates
X Y Z
Three-option > Two-option
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 4.56 −33 −78 −15
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 4.45 −21 −90 0
Two-option > Three-option





bias. Regression analysis revealed negative linear correlation
(r = −0.801, p < 0.01) between decoy effect and the degree
of activation in the left ACC (x = −9, y = 18, z = −9,
Z-score = 3.63, PFWE < 0.05 SVC) in the contrast of targets vs.
competitors (Figure 4H). Individuals with a stronger decoy effect
showed less activation in the ACC (Figure 4I).
DISCUSSION
Our fMRI data provide a neurobiological account of the decoy
effect. Compared with choosing the competitors, choosing the
targets engaged greater activity in the left anterior insula. Activity
in the anterior insula likely reflected greater salience detection
associated with choosing targets as compared with choosing
the competitors. This finding is consistent with the majority
Table 2 | Brain activation at the decision phase.
Brain Regions Z -scores MNI Coordinates
X Y Z
Two-option > Targets
R Precuneus 4.13 9 −51 33
Targets > Two-option
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 5.16 45 −72 −9
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 4.39 −24 −90 −15
Two-option > Competitors
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 4.26 60 −42 27
Competitors > Two-option
L Cuneus/Middle Occipital Gyrus 4.35 −21 −99 −6
Targets > Competitors
L Anterior Insula 3.2 −39 6 3
3.13 −36 3 12
Competitors > Targets
N/A N/A N/A
of literature linking this brain region to salience processing in
imaging studies (Sterzer and Kleinschmidt, 2010). For example,
visible stimuli are usually more salient compared to invisible
ones and are thus found to be associated with anterior insula
activation (Dehaene et al., 2001). While watching an image was
slowly being revealed on a screen, a sudden burst of activity
in the anterior insula was found at the moment of recognition
(Ploran et al., 2007). Recently, activation in the anterior insula has
been associated with intuitive decision making possibly based on
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FIGURE 4 | Brain activation at the decision phase. Regions with
significant activation for responses in two-option condition (two-option) vs.
targets (A), two-option vs. competitors (B), conjunction analysis between
the contrasts of two-option vs. targets and two-option vs. competitors (C),
targets vs. two-option (D) and competitors vs. two-option (E), conjunction
analysis between the contrasts of targets vs. two-option and competitors
vs. two-option (F). (G) Regions with significant activation for targets vs.
competitors. (H) Regions showing correlation between the decoy effect
and ACC activation in the contrast of targets vs. competitors. (I) The
correlation between decoy effect and parameter estimates of ACC
activation for target-competitor contrast at a peak voxel (x = −9, y = 18,
z = −9).
perceptually salient information. Intuition is the ability to under-
stand or know something without conscious reasoning, similar
to heuristics. For example, contrasting dominance-solvable games
with pure coordination games, an fMRI study found that the
insula is associated with extracting salient feature and facilitating
the intuitive judgments in order to make an optimal choice (Kuo
et al., 2009). In addition, activation within anterior insula was
found in a direct contrast between intuitive and non-intuitive
judgments (Volz and von Cramon, 2006).
Previous studies have also suggested an important role of the
amygdala in salience processing. The amygdala is known to react
to both positive and negative stimuli, with a preference for faces
depicting emotional expressions (Sergerie et al., 2008; Santos
et al., 2011). The lack of amygdala activation in the current study
presumably could reflect the absence of emotional salience in the
decoy effect. Instead, the anterior insula activation may reflect
the effect of perceptual salience. This finding suggests the decoy
effect may operate on perceptual process, which is consistent with
a recent study of Trueblood et al. (2013). Trueblood and her
colleagues found that the decoy effect can be generalized to simple
perceptual task using simple perceptual stimuli.
Not everyone responds to decoy manipulations to the same
degree. Our experimental design allowed us to examine for the
neural basis of individual differences in susceptibility to the decoy
effect. When participants’ choice ran counter to the decoy effect,
there was enhanced activity in the left ACC. The ACC is believed
to mediate conflict detection and to exert cognitive control during
thinking (Botvinick et al., 2004; De Martino et al., 2006; De
Neys et al., 2008; De Neys, 2012). For example, De Neys et al.
(2008) found that, the ACC was much more activated when
people solved the conflict base-rate problems than they solve
the no-conflict control versions. Our results are also consistent
with previous work by De Martino et al. (2006), who found
enhanced activity in the ACC when participants ran counter to the
framing effect. The conflict in our case is choosing competitors
instead of targets, that is, abandoning the heuristic response and
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relying on a more analytic strategy. The enhanced ACC activa-
tion when participants were less likely to be affected by decoys
may reflect the conflict detection between heuristic and analytic
processes and further exerting cognitive control over the heuristic
responses.
The dual-process model, proposed by Evans (2003) divides the
process of decision making into contributions from two systems.
System 1 is automatic, intuitive, and influenced by heuristics,
whereas System 2 is deliberative, and subjective to limits of
working memory. Decision making in two-option condition is
more taxing than that in the three-option condition. Confronted
with three-option condition, individuals compare the targets and
the competitors with decoys, respectively. The anterior insula may
detect the perceptually salient similarity between the decoy and
the target. Such salience signal may then guide the dominance
heuristic decision-making in the decoy effect. When participants
rely more on the analytic strategy, they may experience the
conflict between System 1 and System 2 and need extra cognitive
control to inhibit the function of System 1. The more likely they
run counter to the decoy effect, the more conflict they experience,
possibly indicted in the enhanced activation in the ACC.
A few caveats about the present study should be mentioned.
First, it is worth noting that the reaction times in situations
when a decoy was available were significantly longer than RTs
for decisions without a decoy. The behavioral results seem to
be in odds with the idea that the decoy effect is associated with
dominance heuristic. But these results also imply that when decoy
effect occurs, people are taking into account comparative char-
acteristics of alternatives. This process is driven primarily by an
attempt to achieve better resolution and identify the best choice,
not merely by the tendency to simplify the task (Simonson and
Tversky, 1992; Roe et al., 2001). The three-option condition has
more choices than the two-option condition, which might make
the information processing take longer. Thus, heuristic decision
making is not always faster than analytic decision making. Second,
there is difficult to determine exactly when participants made
their decision. For example, it could be 0.5 or 1 s before they
pressed the button. We have tried using 1 s before the button
press time as the onset of events and the results look similar.
Since the temporal imprecision of the BLOD response is poor, it
does not matter much whether the “real” decision making time is
locked to decision execution or 1 s before. Previous studies have
also used this “time locked to the response execution” method to
successfully capture brain responses during the decision making
stage (Yu et al., 2010; Fukunaga et al., 2012, 2013). Further studies
may use hybrid ERP-fMRI to integrate both temporal-spatial
information and further our understanding the dynamics of brain
activity in decoy effect.
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